"On the bright side, I doubt we'll get burgled this summer."

''Turn off the burglar alarm- we've got missiles, Marf, 2012

''So, are we preparing for civil war, or the Olympic games?'' – Commentator

SECURITIZATION AND THE LONDON 2012 OLYMPIC GAMES

A discourse analysis of the discussion concerning the security during the London 2012 Olympic Games

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''They who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.''

Benjamin Franklin, 11 November 1755

Preface

In my Bachelor Landscape Architecture and Spatial Planning, I majored in Spatial Planning. The study dealt with a broad range of subjects which were interesting but too limited for me. Generally, the local and regional scale were covered by the courses, but I was also interested in the global scale and in what happens outside the Netherlands. The result of this ambition was my six months Erasmus Exchange which took place at Lancaster University, in the United Kingdom. There, I have completed several courses which were part of the Geography department. I have broadened and deepened my existing knowledge a lot more than I expected. In the course 'Cities and Globalization' I was introduced to the concepts 'securitization' and 'militarization'. These two terms immediately appealed to me, which resulted in the BSs Thesis which lies in front of you.

Unfortunately, this thesis did not go as smooth as I desired. Due to the combination of an early start of the Erasmus Exchange and a heavy workload at Lancaster University I saw no possibility to complete the thesis before and/or during that period. Before I went to the UK I approached Martijn Duineveld to ask if he would like to be the supervisor for this thesis. He agreed to this, and we also had a meeting to discuss a possible subject, the word 'securitization' was not mentioned once.
However, when I emailed Martijn Duineveld about this subject, he was quite positive. He called it an 'on-Wagenings' subject, which may be the reason that makes it so interesting.

It was not always easy to work on this thesis. Especially when my friends, during summer holidays, asked whether I would like to join them to ''drink a beer on the beaches of the river Rhine'' it was sometimes difficult to reject the offer. Writing this thesis was sometimes fulltime and sometimes part-time, it was very irregular. The single regularity was my daily visit to the library, whether it was for eight hours or 30 minutes. It also struck me how much interesting literature and (sub)topics there are to be studied, therefore focus was a matter I had to work on. Long story short, slow and steady wins the race.

Hereby, I would like to thank Martijn Duineveld for supervising this thesis and his flexible attitude. I am sincerely glad that you showed sympathy despite the fact that it took longer than planned/expected. The conversations we had were inspiring and sometimes raised more questions than they answered. Nevertheless, they encouraged me to complete this thesis.

To some of my friends (Amber, Bart, Brecht, Jurriaan, Lotte, Maarten, Rianne, Rinske and Wietske), thank you for the 'mental support', the well desired and deserved relaxation and for the tips. Dad and mom, thank you for your sympathy and for 'slowing me down' every now and then. And last but not least, thank you '2nd ring of the Forum library', you have sort of become my second home in the past few months.

Writing this thesis was an incredibly informative process. I have learned that you have to be hard on yourself sometimes, by disregarding extremely interesting literature or by 'dragging' yourself to the library, for instance. But, every now and then, you also have to allow yourself some relief, and you should not always impose a tremendous pressure on yourself.

Joep van de Weijer
Wageningen, 11 November 2015

Content

1. Introduction

''It's Saturday morning July 28 2012, I'm having a stroll through my neighbourhood Blackheath in London. I encounter my neighbour who is walking his dogs, we have a short chat about our plans for the weekend and part ways afterwards. I see people rushing to the metro-station in an attempt to catch their metro. But then, I cannot believe my eyes, there is a surface-to-air missile system right in front of me! But wait, there is more! In its surroundings, several soldiers and heavily armed policemen are guarding the battery. What is this nonsense, are we at war?! Slightly baffled I hop on the bus to the River Thames. But when I arrived there, it got even worse; there is a huge warship situated on the River Thames and it carries several fighter jets and military helicopters. I pinch myself to check if it is just a nightmare. But it is not a nightmare, it is all reality, I suddenly remember that London is the host of the 2012 Olympic Games.''
This is a short story that could have been told by any one of the 8,5 million residents of London. In the story some of the security measures taken by the government during the London 2012 Olympic Games are noted.

The presumed aim of security is to deter crime and terrorism and thereby provide a safe and secure environment. Security measures may be deployed by the state – i.e. the government –, companies, or private parties and these measures may be deployed in every appropriate place. This study focuses on security of urban public space. The practice of securing space is also termed 'securitization' of space. Securitization has been part of urban spaces for decades, if not centuries. Recently however, there has been an increasing militarization of urban space which is demonstrated by Stephen Graham's studies concerning military urbanism (Graham, 2010). The security measures and policies are becoming increasingly militarized, which means that military elements (e.g. military devices) are adopted in the use of security (Graham, 2009 I). A lot has been written about militarization of urban public space, its characteristics and implications. Stephen Graham (2009 I; 2010), for example, discusses the 'New Military Urbanism' which involves the militarization of policy debates, urban landscapes, urban infrastructure and culture. In this study, the securitization (closely related to militarization) of urban public space is discussed. An important aspect of cities is this public space, public space is thus an important concept for this study. Several scholars address the importance of public space for everyday life. Bodnar argues that ''public space is peculiar to cities'' (Bodnar, 2015, p. 2091). Other authors such as Carr et al. identify several (basic) needs – which may be satisfied in public space – and rights of people in public space (Carr, et al., 1992). Other scholars also identify certain values of public space (Varna & Tiesdell, 2010). Public space forms the basis for many daily activities such as recreation, transport, political activism, performance and informal exchange (Patton, 2000). In other words, everyday urban life is unimaginable without public space.

To protect from the supposed threats, people concerned with planning and designing these public spaces, 'city builders' – such as architects, urban planners and designers – are increasingly expected to consume and, through practice, to rearticulate the risk-and-threat discourse in, often literally, 'concrete' forms (Coaffee, et al., 2009).

In urban geography discourses concerning securitization, it is assumed that places that host an activity have an increased vulnerability, which could make them victim of terrorist attacks (Nunn, 2007; Coaffee, 2009). Examples of such places are sporting venues, government buildings, health clinics and buildings in the financial 'core' of the country (Nunn, 2007). Consequently, if major sporting events take place in 'risky' states or cities, the security measures – which dominate urban spaces – to defend

against an attack are for example: 'lockdown' security, militarization (military involvement) and drastic legal procedures (Coaffee, 2009; Coaffee, et al., 2011). This study focuses on the securitization of the London 2012 Olympic games.

Before, during and after mega-events the implication of punitive security measures is striking. The legacy of the mega-event is interesting as this temporary event possibly changed the nature of this public space permanently (Coaffee, 2015). This is, however, not the focus of this study. According to the author of this study, it is much more interesting to look at people's perception of securitization during the event. It is, namely, especially during these high-profile events – such as the Olympic Games – that the securitization becomes most visible. It is, then, also most likely that people will become very aware of the development of securitization of urban public space, specifically during the event. The security operation during the London 2012 Olympic Games was Britain's largest one since the second world war (Milne, 2012). Therefore, the London 2012 Olympic Games provide excellent conditions to study people's perception to the securitization of urban public space.

There is some academic literature addressing how security measures impact upon people in terms of their feelings when they are in a space which includes these measures. People may feel reassured of their safety in a space due to the security measures (Patton, 2000). The same security measures, however, may also dis-assure users of that space. A fortified urban landscape, for instance, could increase fear and distrust of the other (Németh, 2010). In the latter case, the security measures could stimulate feelings of anxiety and fear by drawing attention to the fact that one's safety and security is threatened (Coaffee, et al., 2009). This will be further discussed in the literature review.

Much less – than about the implications of security measures on people – has been written about how people perceive this securitization and even less so about how they perceive the securitization of urban public space during high-profile events such as the Olympic games. Even though some authors note that certain actions during the Olympic Games were contested by locals (Fussey, et al., 2012; Coaffee, 2015), it is not further elaborated. The main purpose of the extensive literature review is to demonstrate this literature gap. Furthermore it also serves to gain additional empirical knowledge of the subject. Next to that, it also provides the reader of this report with an insight into concepts that are closely related to the subject of this study.

Research questions

This study is conducted on the basis of the following research question:
What discourses can be identified in the media and comments on these media concerning the securitization of urban public space in the discussion around the security of the London 2012 Olympic Games?

The main research question will be answered on reference to the following sub-research questions:
1. *What discourses can be identified in the online newspaper articles concerning the security of the London 2012 Olympic Games?*
2. *What discourses can be identified in the comments on the online newspaper articles concerning the security of the London 2012 Olympic Games?*

Objective

The objective of this study is to identify the discourses 'present' in the discussion concerning the securitization of urban public space during the London 2012 Olympic Games. This study aims to fill the gap in the existing literature and explore how people perceive the securitization of urban public space, with the discussion of security during the London 2012 Olympic Games used as a case study. This is done by a discourse analysis of online newspaper articles and the comments on these articles. The findings of this study will help to get an insight into the 'views' of the public regarding the securitization of urban public space.

Reading guide

This introduction is followed by chapter 2 Literature review, which provides relevant additional knowledge and includes three main critiques from the scientific literature on securitization. After the second chapter the report continues with chapter 3 Theoretical framework, in which the applied theories are discussed. The third chapter is followed by chapter 4 Research method, this section discusses briefly the research method that is used. The fifth chapter The media, discusses the categories of attitude and discourses that were identified in the online newspaper articles. Chapter 6 The comments, discusses the categories of attitude and discourses that were identified in the responses to the online newspaper articles. In chapter 7 Conclusion, the research findings will be concluded by discussing several identified discourses. The last chapter, chapter 8 Discussion shortly discusses the findings compared to the literature review and the identified main critiques.

2. Literature review

This section of the thesis will explore the literature which relates to the subject. There are several topics that are briefly discussed. Firstly, public space is discussed as this thesis concerns the securitization of urban *public space*. The importance of public space is addressed and a definition of this thesis' usage of public space is given. Secondly, militarization is discussed as this concept is closely related to the subject of this study. Thirdly, securitization is explained and related to militarization. Fourthly, Stephen Graham's military urbanism concept is discussed because it shows close connections with this study. Lastly, the implications of this securitization on public space and 'the public' will be addressed. The analysis of academic articles in this study is used to obtain empirical knowledge about the subject. Moreover, the analysis of the academic literature provides the context (as concepts closely related to the securitization of urban public space are discussed), this helps to fully understand the subject. Also, this extensive literature review allows the researcher to delimit the subject under study, thereby making it possible to focus on one specific subject matter. Lastly, it is also used for indicating the main critiques that exist in the scientific literature concerning the securitization of urban public space.

The importance of public space

''Public space is partly what makes cities'' and *''Public space is peculiar to cities…''* (Bodnar, 2015, p. 2090-2091). Many will agree with these statements of Judit Bodnar, one could even argue: 'what is (left of) a city if there is no public space?' Public space is a very important element of urban space, and urban life is unthinkable without it. As cities are growing larger and the urban population increases, public space becomes more and more important and the development of it more and more relevant, for an increasing public. It is therefore that the researcher focuses this study on urban public spaces. In the usage of public space, the researcher refers to places such as streets, sidewalks, parks and squares. These spaces form the material basis for recreation, transportation, shopping, performance, political activism, and opportunities for informal exchange (Patton, 2000).

Experts that design, plan and build the urban spaces also influence public space in these urban spaces, because public spaces are a part of cities. City building and planning documents often state phrases such as 'high quality public places' or 'world class public realm'. However, there is often a difference between the ambition and the outcome in terms of the publicness of the resulting places (Varna & Tiesdell, 2010). Creating public places is an important component of contemporary urban design (Varna & Tiesdell, 2010). To achieve the 'best results' – whatever these may be – regarding the 'making of' public space, it is thus important to understand the importance of public space, a subject that will be discussed next.

Several scholars (Loukaitou-Sideris & Banerjee, 1998; Tiesdell & Oc, 1998) have identified key functions and 'generally desirable qualities' of the 'public realm', if these are combined public space *''can be considered to have several types of value''* (Varna & Tiesdell, 2010, p. 579). Thus, public space has a certain value, these are the aspects that might be lost if publicness is absent or diminished. Varna and Tiesdell (2010) recognize several types of value. The first value is the political/democratic value. Public space provides a political forum (for political representation, display and action). It offers universal access ('open-to-all'), it is neutral territory and is inclusive and pluralist. Secondly, the social value. Public space offers a ground for unmediated social interaction and communication. The third value is the symbolic one. Public space is symbolic and representative of the collective and of sociability (rather

than individuality and privacy). Several other values can be added to these which are, access value (public space provides access to private land parcels), commercial/economic value (public space provides opportunities for trade and exchange), and leisure value (public space provides opportunities for recreational activities) (Varna & Tiesdell, 2010).

These values provide a measure of the extent to which 'real' public space falls short.

Carr et al. (1992) also address the importance of public space for people. They distinguish five types of reasons which seem to account for people's needs in public places: comfort, relaxation, passive engagement with the environment, active engagement with the environment, and discovery.

According to Carr et al. (1992) comfort is a basic need. They argue that other needs (such as for food, drink, shelter, rest etc.) require a certain degree of comfort to be satisfied. Particular elements determine comfort, some examples are access to sunshine; escape from sunshine; and comfortable seating. Public space is 'something' where these needs can be satisfied. Relaxation is distinguished from comfort by the level of release it describes. A feeling of psychological comfort may be a prerequisite of relaxation. It is argued that relaxation is a more developed state of comfort, with body and mind at ease. Passive engagement with the environment could, in certain situations, lead to a feeling of relaxation. However, it differs from relaxation in that it involves the need for an encounter with the ambience, albeit without becoming actively involved (an example is someone in the park watching other people's movements). On the other hand, active engagement represents a more direct encounter with a place and the people within it. An example of this is having a small talk with a stranger. For this study, active engagement is a very important aspect of public space as this represents social interaction and representation, two valuable components of public space. Daniels (1993) in Coaffee et al. (2009, p. 493) also recognizes this: *''drawing on postmodern and post-structural theories, landscape thus becomes 'a medium in which social relations and processes are formed and reproduced'.''* Lastly, discovery symbolizes the desire or need for stimulation and the satisfaction we have in new, pleasurable experiences (Carr, et al., 1992).

According to Németh (2010) public spaces are home to expressions of dissent and democratic action. Drawing on several scholars, Németh argues that public spaces are sites of open communications and deliberations, in which marginalized groups can voice their opinions, make themselves visible, or disappear anonymously into the crowd (Németh, 2010). When a public space is securitized it ceases to exist as a truly public forum, which is characterized by open access, unmediated deliberation, and shared participation (Németh, 2012). It is also important to note that not all space can or should be public, a certain degree of control is often required and publicness is always subjective. Next to that, public space is never homogeneous thus *''the dimensions and extent of its publicness are highly differentiated from instance to instance.''* (Smith and Low 2006 in Németh, 2012, p. 813).

Drawing on Lefebvre (1968), Németh (2010) notes that people have three rights regarding urban space: the right to access physical urban space; the right to be social; and the right to representation. Németh (2010) asserts that the deployment of punitive security measures – which are said to maintain and safeguard these rights – might actually homogenize and normalize space, which eliminates opportunities for an unmediated experience of public life. In the following section the concepts militarization and securitization – which are related to each other – are introduced. Thereafter, the implications of securitization – i.e. security measures – will be discussed.

Militarization and securitization

Militarization of civil society is a term which refers to the extension of military ideas of tracking, identification and targeting into the quotidian spaces and circulations of everyday life (Graham, 2010). The reason for this process is to identify future threats before they materialize.

Militarization is a concept which is closely related to militarism. Militarism is an ideology which focuses on the best means to solve problems. According to this ideology the use of force and threat of violence are the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems. The main problem-solving tools are then: the exercise of military power, hardware, organization, operations and technology.

Militarization is the implementation of this ideology. It is the practice of arming, planning, organizing, training for, threatening, and sometimes even implementing violent conflict. Thus, to militarize means adopting the core elements of the military model to an organization or situation (Kraska, 2007).

Securitization refers to the practice of securing objects, and possibly people, to protect them from potential harm. After the events of 9/11 security policies and measures changed. Urban security managers responded with a discourse of restricting the opportunities for terrorists to strike. Since 9/11, preparing for the inevitable attack as become common practice (Coaffee, 2009). Security measures which were formerly seen as exceptional were now rapidly normalised with the purpose to protect the city and its inhabitants from terrorists (Coaffee, 2015). It is exactly this normalisation of exceptional security measures which is alarming because it can have profound implications on the built environment and how this environment is used by the public.

Becker and Müller (2013, p. 78) conceive securitization of urban space as *''the hegemony of security and (dis)order concerns regarding the ''proper'' use, design, and (re)ordering of urban space''*. Securitization is characterized by the creation and implementation of legal instruments, policing tactics, and social control strategies. These actions are aimed at cleansing of the built environment from the physical and human rubble created by economic deregulation and welfare shortening. This is done to make the city into a pleasant site and a site for consumption and investment (Becker & Müller, 2013).

The concepts militarization and securitization are related to each other since the means by which urban space is securitized increasingly become militarized. The security measures – e.g. to exclude undesirables – involve military practices more and more. In the case of surveillance cameras: *''This shift represents a process of profound militarization because the social identification of people or circulations within civilian law enforcement is complemented or even replaced by the machinic seeing of 'targets'.''* (Graham, 2009 I, p. 386)

The two concepts are clear, but how exactly do these apply to urban spaces? This will be discussed in the following section.

Securitization applied to urban spaces

Cities are growing larger and larger, the urban population is growing and cities are becoming more dense. Nowadays more than half of the world population lives in an urban area, this number is expected to reach approximately two-thirds by 2050. That is roughly the opposite situation of the rural-urban population distribution of the mid-twentieth century (Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN, 2014).

This situation creates a certain risk. It is a vulnerable situation as a relatively small danger of accident may easily become a catastrophe due to the number of victims (which is likely to be higher in high density areas). Focusing on human threats, undesirable flows or people such as terrorists, insurgents and thieves are nowadays largely indistinguishable from the mass of the city. They are able to creep

invisibly within the density and anonymity offered by the world's prosperous cities (Graham 2009 I). This presents the city with a problem: how are the undesirable flows separated from the 'ordinary' or desirable flows, and how are these removed from the urban space?

The use of military ideas of tracking, identification and targeting in urban spaces is supposed to solve the problem. The aim of the military methods and ideas applied to urban space is to identify future threats before they materialize (Graham, 2009 I).However, it is, due to the mentioned circumstances, rarely clear what or who the problem is and where it is located.

The majority of the population is seen as 'normal' and harmless. But the harmful minority, which is living amongst the same population, is the problem. This minority may include insurgents, terrorists, thieves and so forth. These people may do harm to the rest of the population or may plan to do so.

In other words, the threats blur into the city which makes it difficult to purify urban space (Graham, 2009 II). Because of this, the entire population – along with the everyday spaces, sites and infrastructures - have to be treated as a possible threat (Graham, 2009 I). At this point, the enemy is no longer the minority but the entire population, i.e. everyone.

The emerging security politics are not based on legal or human rights and legal systems based on universal citizenship. Instead they are based on the use of the latest surveillance, identification, tracking and database technologies to pre-emptively profile individuals, places and groups (Graham, 2009 I).

Reasons for securitization

Cities are spaces which 'attract' terrorism for a number of reasons. In order to protect the city against this, security measures are increasingly used in urban public spaces. Securitization of urban space takes place for a number of reasons, the main aim of securitization is to protect something or someone against a threat. Securitization is an attempt to defend the city against bad (undesirable) flows, it is an effort to purify the city (Graham, 2013).

Undesirable flows

Firstly, it is important to explore why these bad, undesirable flows reside in cities. In urban geography discussions it is asserted that places which host an activity are vulnerable to attack. Examples of this are government buildings, sporting venues, and health clinics (Nunn, 2007).

According to Donald Black (1983), terrorism concentrates there where social distances are great and people are close. The social distance is in terms of ethnicity, religion, social class, corporate status, hierarchical authority, or another form of extreme social polarization. By following this line of reasoning it is directly clear why particularly cities are target of terrorists. Cities, especially large cities, usually contain an enormous variety of different social groups which live in close proximity. Those are the two factors which fuel terrorist attacks in cities.

Terrorist's motivations

Terrorists usually have two motivations for an attack. The first one is to deliver a message to citizens and governments. The second one is to spread fear among users of the targeted facility (Nunn, 2007). Wetter and Wüthrich (2015) partly agree with Nunn: drawing on Asal et al. (2009), they state that terrorism fulfils a dual purpose, which is to kill and to send a message. The purpose 'to kill' may also be seen as the cause of the fear of the public, so terrorists may have three motivations for a terrorist attack: to kill, to spread fear and to deliver a message. Urban spaces are thus a target of insurgent

behaviour because there are many people in a relatively small area, which makes it possible to be very effective with whatever intention.

A reason for securitization of urban space is to thus protect people. These people may include the regular civilian population but may also include athletes, politicians, heads of the state or other important persons. It is, naturally, important to protect the athletes from terrorist attacks of some kind. It is, however, no less important to protect the audience of these sporting events. These events are generally on a very large scale and attract hundreds of thousands of visitors during a very short period. This creates circumstances which are interesting for anyone who desires to carry out undesirable behaviour (e.g. to harm to people), as he or she is able to be very efficient by targeting a lot of people with a minor action. The same principle applies to commemorations, political summits, celebrations and so forth. Buildings (such as the 'Twin Towers') are targeted for the same reasons. If a terrorist intents to deliver a message or spread fear he/she is likely to be most effective at this when targeting a place with many people in a relatively small space. In most buildings, this is exactly the case. And if that is the motivation of the terrorist, what better buildings to target than those of political and financial significance? An attack on such structures will attract a lot of publicity which 'spreads their message' and may also spread fear. Next to that, it is also important, for the sake of capital investment, to protect (secure) buildings/urban places.

Safe place for capital investment

Thus, next to providing a safe environment for citizens, a 'deeper' reasoning behind securitization can be found: neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is closely connected to urban renewal projects, the remaking of urban space. Neoliberalism is understood as a *"transnational political project aiming to remake the nexus of market, state, and citizenship from above"* (Wacquant, 2010 in Becker & Müller, 2013, p. 77). There is a lot of investment in real estate development which absorbs the surplus capital. This creates a 'spatial fix' which entails the production of new (urban) spaces within which capitalist production can proceed'' (Harvey, 1990 in Becker & Müller, 2013). The value of real estate investment, however, is directly related to its spatial surroundings. (Smith, 1996; Weber, 2002 in Becker & Müller, 2013). This means that it is important to develop (and commodify) the surroundings of this real estate, the inner city, as well to ensure the attractiveness and competitiveness of the investment. Urban policy makers around the world have agreed that the city should be presented as a safe place for investment because this determines a city's performance in interurban competition. To increase a city's performance in this interurban competition it is thus important to have an excellent inner city which attracts business and consumption. This means that excluding undesirables (such as homeless and beggars) becomes increasingly important because the assumption is that these deter the image of the inner city and discourages consumption (Fussey, et al., 2012). Thus, to provide an environment which is as safe as possible (for the sake of capital investment) sufficient security measures need to be deployed.

Infrastructure terrorism

Cities rely on a vast network of systems and infrastructures which are often interconnected in one way or another. Despite the fact that these systems and infrastructures are critical for the existence of the city and its urban dwellers, they are often taken for granted. Especially in high-tech (Western) cities, people are unaware of the systems and infrastructures that sustain their urban life, this is the case when these systems and infrastructures work.

The reliance of urban dwellers on these huge interconnected systems and infrastructures creates inevitable vulnerabilities. Our dependence on them only becomes most visible when they cease to function, when they fail. One may consider one disruption of a system as a minor problem. This is,

however, often not the case. Disruption or failure in one system could rapidly 'cascade' to the others. For example, the disruption of an electrical grid, also called a blackout, could easily result in a decrease of tap water to the city because the electrically powered water and sewerage systems will also cease to function, as was seen in the 'North American Blackout' (Bennett, 2005). A small malfunction in a critical hub may thus trigger the collapse of a large interconnected system, this is something terrorists know as well. John Hinkson asserts that *''It is ''technological civilization'' that is the target, and the contradiction is that it is this civilization's technology that will be used against it.''* (Graham, 2010, p. 266). This 'infrastructure terrorism' is carried out for the same reasons as 'regular' terrorism: i.e. killing, delivering a message, and spreading fear. The interconnectedness, along with our dependence on these networks and infrastructures, makes infrastructure terrorism highly effective at achieving these goals. As cities, and their inhabitants, rely so heavily on these networks and infrastructures it is important to secure them from any possible threat. It is in these cities where the traditional military ideas of warfare break down as it is no longer possible to use certain weapons (such as missiles), precisely these weapons gave the military the advantage in the open fields (Graham, 2010). It is thus necessary to use other means of counter-terrorism actions. Next to that, the vulnerabilities of Western state, economic and military power are most exposed in the sprawling cities. Duane Schattle (of the US Joint Forces Command's Joint Urban Operations Office) argues that the cities are the problem for military power (Graham, 2010). Wayne Michael Hall (advisor in the Joint Urban Operations Office) thinks that the US forces will be fighting in urban terrain for the next hundred years (Graham, 2010).

Cities are thus seen as vulnerable places which attract terrorism. Cities are densely populated places of social polarisation, high-profile events, capital investment and rely on vast infrastructure networks. It is in cities, where terrorists are able to be very effective with their actions. Therefore, urban spaces need to be secured (by all means possible) to minimize the risk of terrorism.

Military urbanism

Stephen graham is a very helpful scholar concerning this particular subject. He has written several articles regarding militarization and urbanism and a book 'Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism'. When Graham talks about 'the New Military Urbanism' he refers to a complex set of rapidly evolving ideas, practices, doctrines, norms, techniques and cultural arenas (Graham, 2009 I). The metaphorization of war is seen as the perpetual and boundless condition of urban societies against drugs, against crime, terror and against insecurity itself. This involves the militarization of policy debates, urban landscapes and circuits of urban infrastructure, as well as realms of popular and urban culture. Together, these components work to bring essentially military ideas of the prosecution of, and preparation for warfare into the heart of everyday urban life (Graham, 2009 I).

The new military urbanism is closely related to the battlespace concept because everyday sites, spaces and circulations of cities are the key strategic battlespaces of this era (Graham, 2009 II). A battlespace is a boundless and unending process of militarization where everything becomes a site of permanent war (Graham, 2009 I). The distinction between urban battlespaces at home and abroad collapse (Graham, 2009 II) which has several implications for everyday urban life. Policing extraterritorializes, military mobilizations intensify within domestic cities and policing and military power 'mix' to target the urban quotidian at home and abroad in increasingly integrated ways (Graham, 2009 II). This blurring also leads to a transition of militarization and walling of national borders. These pursuits now involve the same techniques and technologies as the walling off of neighbourhoods of Baghdad or Gaza, next to that, it may actually involve contracts with the same military and technology corporations

(Graham, 2009 II). One such example is Raytheon's involvement in the UK's E-border programme, this company is also a leading manufacturer of cruise missiles and unmanned drones (Graham, 2009 I).
In short, there is a deepening connection between urbanism and militarism.

As mentioned before, military urbanism is the process of militarization of (quotidian) urban space. The everyday spaces, sites and infrastructures of cities, including their civilian populations, are now rendered as threats and targets. But where exactly does this process take place, and why there?

Cultural geographies and commentators within Western militaries tend to deem cities to be problematic spaces. They see the city as the main sites concentrating acts of subversion, resistance, mobilization, dissent and protest challenging national security states. As aforementioned, Donald Black (1983) argues that terrorism concentrates there where social distances are great and people are close. Especially in cities, people are very close and social distances may be great, a city is thus a space where terrorism concentrates. The rural or exurban areas, in contrast, are usually seen as the authentic and pure spaces of white nationalism. Whereas the fast-growing cosmopolitan neighbourhoods of the Western cities are often seen as places radically external to the vulnerable nation and threatening or enemy territories just as foreign as Baghdad or Gaza (Graham, 2009 I). In short, rural areas are not rendered as 'dangerous' because there is no such concentration of undesirable flows, whereas in urban regions this is in fact the case. Due to the density of the city, the bad flows are able to hide themselves, which makes it harder to trace and identify these flows.

Military urbanism, thus, takes place in urban areas. However, not every urban area is the same. A city exists of a centre, which may include a financial core and strategic core, a vinex district, the station neighbourhood and informal settlements to name but a few. Every district of the city may have a different use and public, these characteristics could play an important role regarding military urbanism.

Nunn (2007) asserts that specific land uses have links to terrorist motives, he identifies five different land uses: commercial, infrastructure, private, public, and special. Commercial spaces include stores, businesses, offices and media headquarters and special land uses include government facilities. According to Nunn, the land uses commercial and special are the categories which are at greatest risk as these spaces hosted 70 percent of U.S. terrorist incidents from 1997 to 2005. He asserts that this is mainly because these land uses provide a situation which is favoured by different kind of terrorists (such as religious terrorists and environmental actors). What follows from this is that according to Nunn, the land use category public is less at risk than the commercial and special land uses. However, what is not taken into account is that these land uses reside in public areas, which are highly accessible by the public. Government facilities, for instance, may be a major target for terrorists but these facilities are often situated on ordinary streets. If a terrorist was to target this facility – with a vehicle explosive for example – the surroundings of the government facility are also affected. An example of this are the 2011 Norway attacks, with which a lone wolf killed eight people and injured approximately 200 people by a car bomb explosion. So while the specific target of an attack may be a place with a land use which is not explicitly public, the place where this target is situated including its public are indirectly targeted as well.
Cities are specifically targeted because they largely consist of the five land uses identified by Nunn. Although these targets may not be public on their own, the surroundings are likely to be public in a city. The city could thus be seen as a target itself. Referring to Mitchell (2003) Nunn (2007) argues that more targets mean greater vulnerability and higher risks of attack. This, in turn, means that cities thus need protection from these threats. Since the threats seem to blur into the city, where they can reside

anonymously, some deem it necessary to bring military technologies into everyday urban life to attempt to identify the threats before they materialize.

It is now clear what military urbanism, militarization and securitization entail and how they work. It is, however, not yet clear what the implications of these processes are on the public spaces and the public of these spaces. If these processes significantly transform policy debates (and security measures) it inevitably also affects urban space. The researcher specifically focuses on securitization because that can be seen as the actual practice of securing the city, which also involves militarization. The implications of securitization on public space and the people in public space will be discussed in the following section.

Implications of securitization of urban public space on physical accessibility, social interactions, and representation

Drawing on Lefebvre (1968) Németh (2010) notes that people have three rights regarding urban space: the right to access physical urban space; the right to be social; and the right to representation. Németh (2010) asserts that the deployment of punitive security measures – which are said to maintain and safeguard these rights – might actually homogenize and normalize space, which eliminates opportunities for an unmediated experience of public life. The implications of securitization on these rights will be discussed next.

Physical accessibility

The first right includes the access to physical urban space. Changes to material space are naturally the most visible manifestations of urban security, and these changes are able to alter the accessibility of physical space. In order to provide a space which can be used in safety, governments and other authorities tend to restrict access of this public space. To achieve this, it is necessary to establish physical barriers aimed at preventing the undesirable occurrences and flows. This practice is also called 'target hardening' which is based on the assumption that physical protection can make it physically more difficult to carry out a crime or attack, this would thereby theoretically deter would-be offenders (Caoffee, et al., 2009). This method is perceived as a very useful one as it 'tells' the public that the space can be used in safety, while at the same time would-be offenders are told that their actions are likely to be unsuccessful or that it will require a significant degree of effort (Coaffee, et al., 2009).

In 2002, US security theorists Mills and Huber had the vision that called for airport-style security and surveillance systems in cities and its societies (Graham, 2009 I). In a certain way, this vision has already come reality. Surveillance cameras with facial recognition software, for example, are increasingly being used in public spaces. These systems are based on so called biometric identification, the same sort of identification which is used at airports during the digital passport check. High-tech security measures such as these are increasingly used in (pseudo-) public spaces. RET (a Rotterdam transportation company) for instance, installed facial recognition cameras in their busses and trams (de Winter, 2011).

Another method to protect the city against threats is by deploying military(-style) devices in urban areas. This was perhaps most noticeable during the London 2012 Olympic games. To secure the Olympic venues the government situated an aircraft carrier on the Thames (fighter jets and helicopters were standby), several surface-to-air missile systems and snipers on rooftops to name but a few security measures. These are several of the many exceptional security measures taken by the government to secure the city during the event.

The deployment of these military devices is accompanied by the militarization of police. The militarization of the civil law enforcement is another trend aimed at providing a safe environment. Graham argues that military power, policing and state intelligence cross-fertilize to target the everyday urban spaces in increasingly integrated ways (Graham, 2009 II). The policing more and more takes place in ways which are military-like. An example of this is the deployment of SWAT teams, which are increasingly launched against routine call outs (Balko, 2006 in Graham, 2009 II). In the United States, the civil law enforcement increasingly makes use of military weapons and vehicles (Gzedit, 2014; Szoldra, 2014; Sentinel, 2014). The militarization of police is particularly apparent during major events such as political summits, sporting spectacles and major anti-globalization demonstrations. These events may create a vulnerable situation as there are a lot of people in a small area, this may be a target of a terrorist attack. It is thus of great importance to adequately secure these places in order to provide sufficient safety. By doing this it is harder for terrorists or insurgents to access the place and carry out an attack.

Next to the militarization of civil law enforcement and the deployment of CCTV there is another obtrusive security measure, fences or barriers. Fences or other forms of obtrusive barriers have been used for ages to keep undesirables either inside or outside of its perimeters. If fences are used to protect something the main purpose is usually to keep undesirables out. One example of this is visible from gated communities, outsiders are kept out by securing private territory (Pow, 2007). Another example of keeping people out is the redevelopment of people's park in Berkeley. The University of California (UC) and the City of Berkeley desired to develop people's park, local activists, merchants and homeless people however protested against this as they argued that the park represented one of the last truly public places in the city. Every attempt of the UC and city to develop the land was seen as a threat to the public nature of the park. The local activists, students and merchants aimed to create a user-controlled park and laid claim to the land. UC responded by erecting a fence around the park by which people who sought to use it were excluded. UC and the city wanted to reclaim and redefine the park for 'an appropriate public' (which did not include homeless people). The opponents of the UC-City development plan disagreed and argued that they park was working as it should: as a truly public space (Mitchell, 1995). Fences and barriers aim to reduce the physical accessibility of a space. If access to a space is limited, the use of that space is restricted and people's rights are limited Carr, et al., 1992).

Another form of security is designed-in or 'invisible' security. These are security measures that are considered to have a smaller visual impact than the more visible obtrusive security measures. An example of designed-in security measures are the homeless-proof benches. These benches are designed to deter homeless people as they are not able to lay on them due to its shape. People who are not homeless may not even notice that the benches are designed for this purpose, the homeless however will immediately notice this and know they are not welcome there. Most of the time, people only become aware of such designed-in security measures when their behaviour/actions are limited, which is the case with the benches as you cannot lay down. The place may still be accessible but not everything within this place is accessible to everyone.
Another example is the placement of bollards. Bollards are vertical posts which may or may not be able to lower into the ground, they are often designed to have a decorative purpose as well to make them less obtrusive. These bollards restrict access in one way or another. When someone does not need to pass these barriers he/she will barely notice their presence, while someone who needs to be 'on the other side' may find the bollards very annoying as they limit his/her access.

A third example of this are the Arsenal letters close to its stadium (see figure 1). This sign looks like it is just for decorative purposes, on a closer look however it is clear that these are in the same line as other posts. This 'artwork' thus also functions to restrict the accessibility of the physical urban space.

Securitization can thus affect the accessibility of physical urban space. Some security measures are obtrusive, in that case everyone is able to notice that these measures are aimed at securing the space. Other security measures however are less obtrusive and one may only notice that it is a security measure on further inspection.

Figure 1 'Invisible security' at the Arsenal stadium (Blur, 2013)

The security measures are likely to limit the accessibility of urban space (at least for a certain group) to protect and control the space. This does, however, mean that not everyone can access the space as easy, which could, in turn, lead to a decreased 'publicness' of that space. Staeheli and Mitchell (2008) in Németh (2012, p. 814) assert that: *''The key determinant of publicness is access, a feeling conditioned by receptivity, welcome and comfort.''* The nature of public space is thus likely to change as crowded public areas are characterised by their easy accessibility which cannot be altered without radically changing the nature of people's engagement with them (Coaffee, et al., 2011).

Next to physical accessibility, social interaction is another important right in public space. The implications of securitization of urban public space on this right will be discussed in the following section.

Social interactions

The second right includes social interaction and the ability to live a cosmopolitan lifestyle. This lifestyle provides the opportunity to engage in unmediated interaction, or to retreat into anonymity (Németh, 2010). Németh (2010) asserts that many acknowledge that a fortified urban landscape could increase fear and distrust of the other. Janz (2008), in Coaffee, et. al., (2009) even asserts that this dis-assurance could lead to a form of agoraphobia: an anxiety of place. This could lead to a diminished social interaction because of this fear and distrust of the other person(s) or a fear of places.

Security regimes have several implications on the feelings of people. Hard control features such as electronic surveillance, private security guards, and the laws and rules that can restrict actions, influence behaviours or limit interaction. These hardened features could be unsubtle and thereby often affect the behaviour of people, even if they do not aim to cause harm.

The visual interpretation of the security measures works to arouse a certain feeling. The aim of the security measure may be to arouse a feeling of safety and security, showing that the government protects its citizens. However, it may also occur that people are dis-assured by the security measures. In that case the security measures may stimulate feelings of anxiety and fear by drawing attention to the fact that one's safety and security is threatened (Coaffee, et al., 2009).

The increased security management adopted after 9/11 intensifies and reinforces public perceptions of vulnerability, thus increasing the sense of danger and anticipation of attack (Grosskopf, 2006 in Coaffee, et. al., 2009).

The manifestation of security in the built environment can transmit powerful messages through the visual interpretation of it (intentionally and unintentionally). This way, security policy can have a tangible impact upon the spaces in which we live and socialize, and it has the potential to have an extreme impact on how citizens interact with each other. Security measures seek to control urban space which affects the social environment of that space. By controlling public space, the opportunity for unmediated interaction is reduced, because the interaction is controlled in one way or another.

An example of this power of security measures is the use of surveillance cameras. Many scholars compare contemporary CCTV systems with Bentham's ideal prison: the panopticon. The principle of this ideal prison was that the prisoners never knew whether they were being watched and by whom. This leads to a form of 'self-discipline' as someone could be watching you. One could argue that we nowadays live in conditions which represent this panopticon. Hille Koskela (2000) argues that a city with 'absolute predictability will force public space to die, or at least the spontaneous behaviour in it. If public space was not to die, feelings of distrust, doubt and ambiguity will increasingly be the dominant experiences in such space (Koskela, 2000). Furthermore, Coaffee et al. argue that due to people's real or perceived fears, there may be a reticence to use public spaces (Coaffee, et al., 2009).

The social environment of public space and the social interactions which take place in this space are thus likely to change due to increasing security measures. The implications of securitization thus has far-reaching consequences for public space itself and the people within it. This is a very concerning issue as social interaction is one of people's rights according to Lefebvre. Next to that, this active engagement is also a need for people, which they can satisfy in public spaces (Carr, et al., 1992). Next to social interaction, representation is another important right in public space. The implications of securitization on this right will be discussed in the following section.

Representation

The third right includes the right to representation, to a sense of belonging and active citizenship. This right involves opportunities for representation, appropriation, participation and the essential access to decision-making channels (Purcell, 2008 in Németh, 2010). Next to that it involves the ability to actively produce space (Németh, 2010).

Claiming this right can be problematic as the owner(s), managers or regulators of a space determine what action is appropriate and desirable and what action is not, it is thus also very much about power and politics. This right thus can involve acts of protest or dissent, or resistance to the powers threatening the right of representation (Mitchell, 2003 in Németh 2010).

The reduction of this right of representation is accompanied by the decreased use of public space by certain groups of people (usually those articulating political dissent or exercising rights to free assembly). In this case, the 'War on Terror' has become common in the local politics. Some tend to argue that officials use security measures as a means to justify the *''prevention, repression and control of mass citizen political mobilization in cities.''* (Warren, 2002 in Németh, 2010, p. 2489).

The diminution of the right of representation has to do with exclusion. Usually the transgressor is deemed out of place, he threatens to produce space in a way that is not favoured by the managers, owners or regulators of this space (Németh, 2006).

According to Agustina and Galdon Clavell (2011) one should look at the effects it will have on civil rights before implementing CCTV. Referring to Andrew von Hirsch (2000), they argue that surveillance in public spaces could have a chilling effect on the freedom of speech or assembly in public space. Agustina and Galdon Clavell furthermore note that the right to demonstrate and to express oneself in public space would be severely affected by video surveillance and the recording of their images (Agustina & Galdon Clavell, 2011).

Patton (2000) argues that surveillance introduces uncertainty into public place, it is for people less transparent who their actions are accessible to and in what circumstances their actions may be viewed. This could be a source of anxiety for people in that space because they could think that it does not provide reliable cues to how they should behave in that space (Patton, 2000).

In 'The End of Public Space' (1995) Mitchell addresses how certain populations envision public space and how the university and planners envision the same public space, People's Park. For activists and homeless the park is a space within which political movements are able to organize and expand into wider arenas. For them, People's park is a space for representation, which is a public space in which political movements can gather and be seen. In contrast to them, the University and planners preferred to see People's park as a space for recreation and entertainment, and subject to usage by an appropriate public. The latter group conceive public space as a planned, orderly and safe space, in which an appropriate public is allowed access. In this vision, the space is not accessible to everyone so some populations are excluded from representation (in this case the homeless community and political activists).

Another example is provided by Németh (2006) in his study concerning LOVE park in the centre of Philadelphia. Throughout history, the park had been the space for political demonstrations, civic events and electoral campaigns. In the mid-1990s skateboarders found LOVE park an attractive place to 'perform', since then the park has been a space used by skateboarders. In the early 2000s the city developed a redevelopment plan which would ban skateboarders. Next to that, the city established a 24-hour police presence in the park to enforce the ban. The city found the skateboarders disorderly and unruly, which was the main justification for their exclusion.

It is argued that the denial of access to public space becomes a denial of citizenship and representation in public space. Furthermore, citizenship and representation are directly related to visibility in public space. Because of this, space cannot be called truly public if its *''maintenance requires the marginalization or exclusion''* of a certain population (Németh, 2006, p. 314).

A last example is offered by Coaffee et al. (2011) who note that during the London 2012 Olympic Games there were restrictions on protest and assembly around the Olympic venues. Both protest and assembly may be forms of representation and thus a right of people in public space. In this regard, the restrictions on these acts diminish at least one right, with severe implications on the nature of urban public space and how it is used.

Restrictions on representation in public space thus can have serious implications on people and their behaviours in this space. This, in turn, affects the nature of public space as people's engagement with it is altered. Disciplinary techniques – adopted with the increasing securitization – aimed at ordering public space and society thus have major implications on public space and people's rights in public space. The adoption of these security measures can reduce the publicness of public space. Some scholars have even argued that space cannot truly be called public anymore due to the implications of security measures on the rights of citizens.

Main critiques

From the literature review, three main critiques on the securitization of urban public space become clear. The first critique is that, nowadays, safety seems to precede everything else. It is tried to prepare for the inevitable attack. This leads to the phenomenon that security politics are no longer based on legal or human rights, but on the use of the latest surveillance and security technologies. A presumed reason for security is to provide a safe environment for capital investment. This often leads to the exclusion of certain undesirable populations, which is also known as 'purifying the city'.

The second critique connects to the first one. Due to this 'safety before everything else' notion, the built environment and its utilisation are very much affected. Especially impacts on the access to public space, social interactions within public space and representations within public space appear to be major issues. Some authors have even argued for 'the end of public space'.

The third critique is closely connected to the other two. Scientific literature identifies a 'War on Terror' – a (civil) war conducted by the government against their own civilians. Everyone is treated as a possible threat, and everything becomes a site of permanent war. This 'War on Terror' seems to be closely related to the securitization of urban public space since scholars often refer to it in reports about securitization. Securitization of urban public space may even be seen as an underlying process (or tool) of this war. It is clear that these three critiques are closely related and rooted in one another. In the discussion (chapter 8) these critiques will be compared to the research findings in the media and the comments. The following section discusses the theoretical framework that was used for this thesis.

3. Theoretical framework

In order to address an issue and to express your feelings regarding this issue it has always been common to discuss it in one way or another – for example in media. One example of how it is discussed is a debate in which opposing and proposing parties try to convince others of their opinion. However, after newspapers and articles became accessible via the internet, it soon also became possible to leave a comment – i.e. a written text – on it. It became possible to voice your opinion through another medium: comments on online articles. Since people voice their opinions in these comments, it is possible to explore people's ideas of something by analysing these comments. Through analysis of the formulation and content of the written texts it can be found out how people feel about the subject/development, i.e. how they perceive it. For this study, discourse analysis is the method used to explore how people perceive the securitization of urban public space. This theory is necessary to analyse and to place the literature and responses/comments in a perspective. It is important to introduce two terms first: media and comments.

Due to the fact that this research analyses media sources, the term media is important. As will be seen later, several discourses can be identified in the media. The term media refers to 'means of reaching others' (Mulder, 2006). This study focuses on the media-category 'written language'. The more specific focus of this study is the 'online written news media' which delivers news to a target public or the general public. Online newspaper articles are texts which describe an event and often cite other articles or statements of people. Due to its nature of being online it is often possible to comment on these articles and reply to other comments.

Next to the media, discourses may also be identified in the comments. The term comment refers to the responses of people on the online newspaper articles or a reply on another comment. Through these comments, people are able to structure reality and what they consider is the truth and what is not. The possibility of responding to the online newspaper article allows them to express their feelings and thoughts concerning the subject.

Discourse theory

The term 'discourse' is used in a range of meanings (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005), and 'discourse' means different things to different researchers, and to their audiences as well (Sharp & Richardson, 2001). Any conception of discourse analysis as a methodological approach is rooted in a wider theory of discourse. And depending on this theory drawn upon, the approach that is used will draw upon particular units and techniques of analysis (Atkinson, et al., 2010).It is thus important to identify a clear definition of 'discourse' in order to delineate the research and to make evident what the research is studying. Schiffrin et al. (2003) note that there are three main categories of discourse definitions:
Firstly, as 'anything beyond the sentence'. In this definition, discourse looks at anything beyond the singular sentence. For example, if two people are having a conversation, you have discourse. The people who would be particularly interested in this definition (and associated analysis) are linguists.
Secondly, 'language in use'. This is about how people 'go about doing language' in the context that they are doing it. For example, a conversation that two people are having in a supermarket would be use of language in a specific situation. This definition is most applicable to applied linguists
Thirdly, 'a broader range of social practices that includes non-linguistic and nonspecific instances of language.' In this conception, discourse can include social practices that are non-linguistic – such as the clothes they are wearing, gadgets they carry, gestures etc.

With regards to the third definition, Foucault (discussed in Foucault, 1972) sees it as not just the language of an individual communication. Rather, he sees it as the larger systems of thought within a particular historical location that make certain things 'sayable', and regulating who can say them.

It is about how a particular period in time and a particular place would construct a particular understanding about an phenomenon.

In its simplest form, when people talk to each other, they are engaged in 'discourse'. In this interpretation, discourse appears at public events – such as inquiries, meetings and in consultation processes. The analysis of speeches, discussions, conversations, articles and statements can all be seen as examples of this type of discourse as text (Sharp & Richardson, 2001). In such cases what counts as discourse is that wat is said or written (for example, Hastings, 1999).

Discourse theory fits in the interpretative or social constructionist tradition in the social sciences (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). A fundamental assumption of this tradition is the existence of multiple, socially constructed realities instead of a single reality that is governed by natural laws (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). It is thus not the phenomenon itself that is of interest to discourse analysis, instead the emphasis lies on the way in which society makes sense of this phenomenon (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). If reality is considered as socially constructed, it also implies attention for the specific situational circumstances. It is important to take into account what the historical, cultural and political context is in which a particular account of reality (truth) arises (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005).

Language shapes one's view of the world and reality, instead of being a neutral medium mirroring it – this is the basic assumption of discourse analysis (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Hajer, 2006).

Discourse analysis assumes that language is a representation of reality/actuality. Discourse analysis thus 'sees' language as something through which reality – and associated social life – is constructed. With this approach in mind, language may be regarded as a discursive means, through which discourses are constructed (van den Berg, 2004).

It is important to mention that the meanings come into politics through a set of operational routines and mutually accepted rules and norms that structure social life. Language does not 'float' in society, instead it should be related to the specific practices in which it is employed (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Forester, 1999).

The concepts 'discourse' and 'discussion' are used interchangeably, but they should be distinguished in terms of analytics (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005).

In this research discourse is defined as:

''an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices.''
(Hajer, 1995, p. 44; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005, p. 175).

It is derived from this definition that 'discussion' is the object of analysis. A discourse analysis aims to identify linguistic regularity that can be found in discussions and debates (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005).

This definition relates to how Foucault perceives discourses. In his conceptualization, the power struggles between different competing discourses generates the conditions that shape the social and physical world (Sharp & Richardson, 2001).

Discourse analysis

Van den Berg (2004) discusses four implications of discourse analysis on language. The first implication is the assumption that language creates its own reality, and it has to be treated as social behaviour. The second implication is that the use of language produces meaning – a reality or truth – of which the user of it is not always aware. In other words, it is not only 'messages' that are being exchanged in communication, it is also 'meta-messages' – which are inherent in the use of language – that are being shared. The third implication is that the use of language (as do other social behaviours) can have profound consequences, both intended and unintended. Intended consequences refer to something that is tried to achieve through language. Unintended consequences refer to the phenomenon that the meanings that are constructed through language start to 'live their own life'. For example, if media coverage of social conflicts and insecurity is predominantly about a clashing of cultures, these types of conflicts will likely adopt this character. The fourth and last implication is that language is context-dependent. Everything that people communicate (also through language) can vary from instance to instance, it depends on a particular situation.

Foucauldian discourse analysis

An important aspect of a Foucauldian perspective of discourse it the concept of governmentality. With this concept in mind, a certain discourse is no longer 'innocent', but it can be seen as an attempt to discipline society (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). This concepts is particularly useful in the analysis of the discussion concerning securitization since it literally deals with issues of security and techniques to control the population (Darier, 1999). The aim of this Foucauldian discourse analysis is not to provide recommendations on 'what should be done', rather it is to identify the development of discourses in the modern era (Hajer, 1995; Richardson & Sharp, 2001). One of the major abilities of this type of discourse analysis is to trace the discursive power struggles underlying environmental politics (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). This type discourses analysis attempts to identify regularities in the terms that are employed in a discussion. However, it does this while being aware that the actors that articulate the statements might do with a certain tactical or strategic goal in mind (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005).

4. Research method

The way this study is conducted is by dividing it into two parts: the analysis of online newspaper articles and the analysis of comments on these online media articles.

It is important to note, however, that I first analysed the academic literature. From this analysis (from the literature review) the three aforementioned key critiques around securitization of public space are identified. This provided the researcher with a general idea of the critiques on securitization (that is, critiques from academic literature). These three key critiques do not form some kind of framework, in which the discourses of the media and comments are forced. Instead they are used as a sort of example of what kind of issues are associated with the topic, that example may be useful in identifying the discourses in the media and the comments.

After that, an analysis of online newspaper articles is conducted. In total, 37 articles are analysed. These articles have been found via the online search engine 'google' by searching for articles that talk about the security during the London 2012 Olympic Games. The search terms that have been used are: 'security 2012 Olympic Games', 'securitization Olympic Games', 'security measures Olympic Games', 'Olympic security London'. Additionally, websites of the online newspaper articles allow for searching for articles as well. The combined use of both search methods provided the articles that are analysed. As a start, the articles were read quickly to determine whether it was a useful (relevant) article or not. If the article was indeed useful it was critically analysed, the useless articles were disregarded in the analysis. An article was found useful when in 'truly' reported facts, figures or statements that are about the security during the 2012 Olympic Games. For a start, the useful online articles were analysed to identify a particular attitude or stance towards the securitization of urban public space. Then, the online articles were studied to identify particular (reports of) statements (potentially made by others than the author) to attempt to identify the discourse. Noelle-Neumann (1974) asserts that mass media can shape the public opinion. The mass media provides the environmental pressure to which people respond with acceptance, alacrity or silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). People's comments may thus be shaped by the online newspaper article on which they respond, it may even determine the 'direction' of the comment. Next to that, these articles work as the incentive for commentators to respond to it, it thereby also provides the context for the comments. The online newspaper articles provide the background for the responses.

Secondly, an analysis is undertaken of the comments on the online newspaper articles. In total, approximately 1815 comments are analysed. The comments are all responses to analysed articles. The comments were read quickly to determine their relevance. The relevance of the comments was determined by whether the comment contains statements that directly relate to the newspaper article or to the topic of the newspaper article – if that was indeed the case, it was assumed relevant. If the comment was relevant, it was subjected to further critical analysis. If the comment was irrelevant, it was disregarded. Critical analysis entails analysing on what particular statement or comment the commentator is responding, identifying the attitude of the comment towards securitization and identifying the discourse of the comment. The amount of critically analysed comments is thus lower than 1815, the exact number cannot be determined as these have not been counted. The advantage of analysing online comments is that people can respond in relative anonymity, they may therefore react with their 'raw opinion'. People may be scared of isolation if they do not agree with the masse's opinion and publicly announce this (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). Therefore, online comments can be more 'legit' (than an interview) as the commentator is less affected by this fear. By analysing the contents and formulation of the comments it is possible to deduce people's perception regarding the securitization of urban public space.

During the research attention will have to be paid to several aspects (Gibbs, 2015):
- Hidden relations of power that are present in the articles and comments
- Who is exercising the power, that is, whose discourses are being represented
- Who are consulted for the article and comments
- Who is the audience for the article and comments
- What is left unspecified or unsaid in the article and comments
- The use of passive voice, or processes expressed as 'things'
- The use of colourful, descriptive language (adjectives) to indicate a strong discourse

Questions that will have to be continuously asked during the research are (Gibbs, 2015):
- Would alternative wording of the exact same information have resulted in a different privileged discourse?
- How are the events presented?
- How are people in the article characterised?
- What message does the author intend you to get?
- What repetition exists within this article and the comments and between different articles and comments on the same topic?

The discussion that will be studied is one which revolves around the securitization of urban public space, specifically during the London Olympic Games. In July 2007 London was assigned as the host for the Olympic Games in 2012. The day after London's bet was accepted/approved, a terrorist attack took place in London which killed 52 people and injured more than 700. It became clear to everyone – including the civilians and the government – that London was (and maybe is) a vulnerable city. Therefore, the security measures for the Olympic Games had to be as good as possible to ensure a safe and secure environment. This lead to extreme security measures such as restrictions on protest and the deployment of the military; fighter jets; combat helicopters (with snipers); a huge warship on the river Thames and last but certainly not least, six missile-systems based in the centre of Great-Britain's capital. It is during this event that the securitization of urban public space became strikingly noticeable. This naturally lead to expansive discussions about the security plans and policies and whether these were truly appropriate or not. To my best knowledge, this is a rather unique accumulation of discussions concerning the securitization of urban public space. That is exactly what makes this particular discussion exceptionally interesting.

Limitations research

Every research has limitations, so does this one. It is important to mention that the results of this thesis are highly dependent on the interpretation of the researcher. This influences the identification, structure and analysis of the discourses. Next to that, this thesis and the findings have to be considered as an indication. It gives an insight into people's perceptions regarding the securitization of urban public space. Perhaps this study is a motivation for other(s) (researchers) to conduct further research concerning this particular topic. Attaining a deeper understanding of the perceptions of the securitization of urban public space may help geographers and 'landscape-makers' gain a better understanding of people's views regarding the securitization of urban public space. This could, in turn, potentially lead to more adequate (security) planning, design and policies.

5. The media

This section discusses the categories of attitudes that were identified in the media. The distinct categories are discussed in detail, with reference to specific statements in the online newspaper articles. The discussion of the categories is followed by the discussion of the discourses that were identified in the media. Each discourse is discussed in detail including specific examples (e.g. of statements) that lead to its identification.

Categories of attitude within the media

The media, in delivering news, may be biased in one way or another. In the coverage of news, this may manifest itself in ignoring data or the emphasis of certain information. This is noticeable if multiple media sources are studied, only then, you can get a full understanding of the situation. Many people, however, do not read multiple newspapers and certainly not various articles about the same subject. The online newspaper articles provide the background for the responses of the commentators. So in order to analyse the comments, it is necessary to analyse the online newspaper articles on which they have responded as well. The people, and their responses to the online media articles, may thus be influenced by the coverage in the article. Therefore, it is useful to determine how the media portray the securitization of urban public space during the London 2012 Olympic Games, which will be done in this section of the thesis. The online newspaper articles are divided into three categories: the optimistic, the critical and the impartial category. these categories have emerged from the analysis of the online media articles. This analysis led to the identification of the different common 'directions' or attitudes of the online newspaper articles. All categories are supplemented by a diagram which shows an overview of that particular category.

Optimistic attitude

This category is characterized by reporting predominantly optimistic statements concerning securitization. This could affect people's perception or ideas regarding this subject, and in turn alter their response. Gibson's article in the Guardian (Gibson, 2011, p. 1) is chock-full with optimistic statements from Lord Coe, London 2012 chairman. The unusually high levels of security are justified by phrases such as: *''This is unique''*, and other phrases saying that this opportunity should not be missed. Another characteristic of this category is that articles may propose certain security measures by naming its advantages. One such example is the coverage regarding the use of drones during the 2012 Olympic Games. It is said that the use is controversial because of collateral damage, however they justify this by noting: *"But they are also highly effective.''* (Taylor, 2011, p. 1) It, then, goes on to state several uses of drones. The last characteristic of this category is positive coverage about security. One example of this is from an article published after the 2012 Olympic Games: *"The security of the Games has been a success.''* (Gibson & Topham, 2012, p. 1). From such statements it seems that there have not been problems with security, which is not true. It is true that a terrorist attack did not take place. But the media seem to disregard the fact that some security measures were contested by the public. The diagram on the next page provides a schematic overview of the optimistic media.

How do the optimistic media report the issues relating to the securitization of the 2012 Olympic Games?

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┌─────────────────────────┐
│  Cautiously optimistic  │
│  attitude towards the   │
│  securitization of the  │
│  2012 Olympic Games     │
└─────────────────────────┘
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| Optimistic statements justifying the use of 'extreme' security measures | Disregarding negative facts concerning the security of the 2012 Olympic Games |

Critical attitude

The media that is part of the critical media category is obviously or very cautiously critical towards securitization, that also provides the context for the comments. This category is characterized by news coverage which is largely dominated by opposing statements regarding securitization or specific security measures. An example in one of the articles is: *"Some residents fear the high-velocity missile system… could make the complex more vulnerable to attack."* (Booth & Hopkins, 2012, p. 1). In this article, the vast majority of statements are of this nature, i.e. there are few positive statements concerning the installation of missiles on the roofs of the flats.

Another column in the Guardian is extremely critical as well. The title sets the tone for the rest of the article: *"The London Olympics is a corporate lockdown – why not a Games for all?"* (Milne, 2012, p. 1) The author, quite literally, argues he does not appreciate securitization by stating: *"Securitisation is sucking enthusiasm out of the games."* (Milne, 2012, p.1)

Furthermore, this category is characterized by statements which might be perceived as frightening. One such example is: *"At times it seemed there had been a kind of benign coup."* (Norton-Taylor, 2012, p. 1) The same article also refers to academic literature which argues that the increased securitization of the city has the potential to leave a lasting legacy.

The last characteristic of this category is how the texts are worded or phrased. They could be phrased or worded in a way that steers people to a more critical stance concerning securitization. The following poll is a perfect example of this: *"Would you feel safe with a missile launcher on your roof? Residents close to the London Olympics site have been told that, as part of security measures, the army may put missile launchers on the top of a tower block. Would you be happy to have surface-to-air missiles on your roof?*

'Yes, I'd do anything to stop the terrorists' = 57%

'No, It would make me and my family a target' = 43%" (Guardian-unlimited, 2012, p.1)

The answers to the poll are badly phrased. Firstly, to do 'anything to stop terrorists' is quite extreme, people may want to do something but not sacrifice everything to actually stop them. Secondly, the 'no' answer involves family into the question and states they (and you) could be a target, which may scare people. Nevertheless, the majority voted 'Yes'. This is, however, overshadowed by the fact that the vast majority of the comments is critical. The diagram on the next page provides a schematic overview of the critical media.

How do the critical media report the issues relating to the securitization of the 2012 Olympic Games?

| Cautiously or obviously critical attitude towards the securitization of the 2012 Olympic Games |

| Dominated by opposing statements concerning securitization/security measures | Statements about security measures that may be perceived as frightening | Phrasing or wording texts in a certain way to provoke a critical response |

Impartial attitude

The impartial category is the largest one. This is explained by the fact that many online articles did not indicate a particular attitude towards the topic. Next to that, this is a relatively small study, which makes it somewhat difficult to analyse the articles extremely thoroughly, this could mean that the researcher has missed something. This leads to the possibility that an article which is part of the critical or optimistic category, is not recognized as such and categorized as 'impartial'.

The major characteristic of this category is its objective coverage of news about the security during the Olympic Games. Mostly, facts and numbers are noted without connecting a conclusion to it. They just deliver the facts and leave it up to the readers to draw their own conclusions. For instance: *''More than 1,000 soldiers stationed in Germany who got back from Afghanistan in April will be sent to the UK to help bolster the Olympic security operation, the Guardian can reveal.''* (Hopkins, 2012, p. 1).

There are numerous similar examples of this that can be found in the online media articles.

The online media articles which are part of this category do not seem to be biased in one way or another. The diagram below provides a schematic overview of the impartial media category.

How do the impartial media report the issues relating to the securitization of the 2012 Olympic Games?

| Impartial/neutral attitude towards the securitization of the 2012 Olympic Games |

| Objective coverage of news about security – facts and figures |

The categories of the online newspaper articles concerning the securitization of the London 2012 Olympic games have been identified and discussed. These provide the background and context for the comments – i.e. the responses on theses online newspaper articles. In the following section, the discourses that were identified in the online media will be discussed.

Discourses media

In the online newspaper media, several discourses are identified. The discourses that are identified in the media are: impact on liberties, (impact of) missiles, safety before everything else, security attractive/deterrence to threats/terrorists, opportunity, military involvement, war(zone) and financial/economic. In this section, each of these discourses are discussed and examples are provided.

Impact on liberties

The 'impact on liberties' discourse is characterised by a line of reasoning that emphasizes the impact of the security measures for the Olympic Games in London on liberties of the population. One of the statements in an online article this discourse 'gave rise to' is: *"But the scale and visibility of the London operations, including powers to crack down protest and even remove critical posters from private homes, go far beyond the demands of any potential threat."* (Milne, 2012, p. 1).

However, other articles mentioned that Chris Allison – in charge of policing the Olympic Games – said that *"the police would not try to stop legitimate and peaceful protest during the Olympics."* (Dodd, 2009, p. 1; Hopkins, 2012, p. 1). Yet another article emphasized that *"ministers are planning legal action to restrict public protest during the Olympics… Ministers' plans… includes identifying "exclusion zones" around key locations."* (Brady, 2011, p. 1).

Such lines of reasoning even lead one author to title the article *"Legacy of biggest UK peacetime security operation could have implications for civil liberties"* (Norton-Taylor, 2012, p. 1).

The discourse is also articulated in practice by the removal of protesters. *"People have a right to protest and it is an incredibly important part of our democracy," said the Metropolitan police in their customary fashion after they arrested 182 people on the Critical Mass cycle ride during the Olympic opening ceremony. But – there is always a "but" here – we are asked to understand they had to balance this right with other people's "rights to go about their business"* (Qasim, 2012, p. 1).

The same article claims that this 'balancing the rights' *"merely serves to hide that they manage our lives in such a way to make dissent as invisible and unattractive as possible, during the Olympic and beyond."*. Many reports in the media in this discourse are statements that attempt to justify the restrictions on civil liberties. Next to that, it is said that they have to weigh up different rights. So it seems that it is said that the actual execution of the law (restricting liberties) is done because they have to take into account other liberties as well. It then also seems that those in power are the ones that determine which liberty/law is more important.

(Impact of) missiles

This discourse is characterised by emphasis on the impact of the deployment of missiles on flats and in residential neighbourhoods. Several online media report that the residents were not aware of those plans until shortly before the deployment and reacted angrily to the news (Peck, 2012 III; Gibson, 2011). Next to that it is mentioned that the residents were *"not consulted"* (Booth & Hopkins, 2012, p. 1). One online article also cited the defence secretary as follows: *"An 'appropriate and scaleable' air security plan includes Typhoon aircraft at RAF Northolt, helicopters operating from HMS Ocean and 'appropriate' surface to air missile systems."* (Gibson, 2011, p. 1). The inverted commas may imply that the author of the article is critical toward the 'appropriateness' of the security measures. It is also reported that the residents think that you cannot fire such a missile above a highly populated area, because of the debris (Booth, 2012). It is evident that the unrest amongst the residents is not expressed merely textually but also practically as they went to *"the high court to stop the army putting missiles on their roof"* because they were not consulted and because it could be vulnerable to terrorist attack (Milne, 2012, p.1).

Safety before everything else

The 'safety before everything else' discourse is characterised by lines of reasoning which indicate that everything possible needs to be done to provide a safe environment. This discourse is very much recognisable in practice since the security measures are indeed deployed in the real world. It is said that the operations are planned for *''the worst-case scenario, not the most likely scenario, but we believe that it is prudent to be prepared.''* (Peck, 2012 III, p. 1). This reasoning is rearticulated by statements such as *''deliver security of the highest order''* (Booth & Hopkins, 2012, p. 1) and *''there is no appetite for risk.''* (Gibson, 2012, p. 1). Security officials (that are quoted in online articles) justify the deployment of extensive security with such statements. On the contrary, at the same time it is argued that *''it is impossible to guarantee the security of the Olympic Games''* and that there is *''no such thing as guaranteed security''* (Johnson, 2012, p. 1).

In the media this discourse is clearly dominated by security officials and other government functionaries alike. The reasoning behind the extensive security measures is that they plan for the worst-case scenario to minimize the risk, although there is no guaranteed security. Nevertheless, it (i.e. the 'safety before everything else' idea) is perceived as a justification for the deployment of extensive security measures.

Security attracts or deters threats

This discourse is characterised by reasoning that the security measures in place are meant to deter threats – such as terrorists – but may simultaneously attract them.

The online media often cite security officials that emphasize that the security operations deter the threats. The defence secretary is quoted: *''there will be a full level of multi-layered defence and deterrence for the London Games…''* (Gibson, 2011, p. 1). Another security official who was in charge of co-ordinating the armed forces during the Olympic Games said that *''the anti-aircraft missile systems would help deter the larger threats, and the snipers would be used for the smaller ones''* (Booth & Hopkins, 2012, p. 1). Residents living in close proximity to the missile-systems expressed that they *''don't know if they will become a target for terrorists or what the likelihood is that they will be used.''* (Booth & Hopkins, 2012, p. 1) and they *''don't really know if it will make us feel safer or more of a target.''* (Booth, 2012, p. 1). Apparently, the residents were certain the government was putting them at risk, that they even went to the high court, but they failed (Milne, 2012).

One online article ends *''Did all those expensive security measures in place deter any planned attacks? We may never know.''* (Norton-Taylor, 2012, p. 1). This statement symbolizes the 'core' of this discourse rather well. We may indeed never know whether the security operations truly deterred or attracted terrorist attacks.

Opportunity

The 'opportunity' discourse is predominantly characterised by the reasoning that hosting the Olympic Games is a very special opportunity to showcase Great Britain. It is reported that the Olympic Games are a *''tremendous opportunity to showcase what the private sector can do in the security space''* - since great part of the security operations were employed by G4S, a private security firm (Milne, 2012, p. 1).The defence secretary is cited the *''Olympic and Paralympic Games are once-in-a-generation events for the UK. We want them to be secure''* (Tapsfield & William, 2011, p. 1).

Such statements are trying to justify the extensive security operations during the Olympic games. However, those are not the only type of statements in this discourse. One article, for example, mentioned that *''Bureaucrats and lawmakers have internationalised efforts to use the Olympics to install and expand intrusive, permanent surveillance measures''* (Tudge, 2012, p. 1).

Yet another author referred to an International Affairs essay, arguing that *"The Olympic Games and other mega-sports events become opportunities not only to test and refine security technology and strategies, but also to assess the level of public acceptance of increased levels of surveillance"* (Norton-Taylor, 2012). There is thus some minor critique present in the media (in this discourse) concerning the securitization. In contrast to security officials (from the government) – who see the Olympic Games as an opportunity to show how 'great' Great Britain is, which presumably requires extensive security measures – this media recognizes it is also an opportunity to expand the intrusive security measures, and to test the level of public acceptance of these measures.

Military involvement

This discourse is characterised by many statements concerning the involvement of Great Britain's army. *"Troops drafted in to protect London 2012 venues after the G4S fiasco make up 50 per cent of security personnel stationed at the Olympic Park."* (Hodge & Pickover, 2012, p. 1).

This was a tremendous raise of security compared to the earlier plans. However, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport *"insisted that the decision to increase the number of security staff from 10,000 to 23,700 was not in response to "any specific security threat"* (Ziegler & Woodcock, 2011, p. 1). This raise of security was merely to ensure a safe and secure games, it was argued (Ziegler & Woodcock, 2011). This, of course, sparked fears in the population. People were assured by the government that London would not feel siege-like. The government assumed that *"the idea that there will be more people on our streets in uniform (whether khaki or blue) could go down very well"* (Stern, 2012, p. 1). Next to that, the police confirmed the population that the military personnel would not patrol the streets (Peck III, 2012). Furthermore, after the Olympics it was argued that the fears of over-militarization of the Olympic games were exaggerated. And evidence had suggested that the presence of the military came as a welcome relief (Gibson & Topham, 2012).

In this discourse, the government tries not to 'scare' the civilians. When they do scare them, they downplay the fears by arguing that the military presence will not be very obtrusive. In reality, the army did patrol the streets, but the government asserted that this was seen as a welcome relief.

War(zone)

The 'war(zone)' discourse is characterised by the line of reasoning that the high security measures deployed during the Olympic Games in London create a sort of war(zone). One online article argued that the closer the Olympics came, the more London started to look like a 'militarised occupation zone', and referred to East-London as 'Lockdown London' (Milne, 2012). The chairman of London 2012 said that the security had to be proportional because London should not look like a siege city. He asserted that that was *"certainly not what you're going to get a legacy tourism from"* (Gibson, 2011, p. 1). Although the government said that *"the Games should be a peaceful celebration of sporting achievements and a cultural celebration – not a security event"* (Gibson, 2011, p. 1), others said that *"At times it seemed there had been a kind of benign British coup"* (Norton-Taylor, 2012, p. 1). From these lines of reasoning, it is clear that the government and Olympic Games Committee wanted London to look like a welcoming city. The media, however, as also reported that this was not quite achieved, instead it was the opposite. The author that referred to 'Lockdown London' also argued that London reflected a legacy of the war on terror and the deregulation of unbridled corporate power (Milne, 2012). This discourse is very much associated with the idea that London became a warzone or seemed to be at war during the Olympic Games

The analysed online newspaper articles provide the context for the comments. In the following section, the categories of attitudes and the identified discourses in the comments are discussed.

6. The comments

This section discusses the categories of attitudes that were identified in the comments. Each distinct category is discussed in detail, with references to specific statements in the comments on the online newspaper articles. The discussion of these categories is followed by the discussion of the discourses that were identified in the comments. The discourses are separately discussed in detail including specific examples that lead to its identification.

Categories of attitude within the comments

People's attitude towards the securitization of urban public space during the Olympic Games in London are divided into four categories: the optimistic, the critical, the impartial and the uninformed category. These categories have originated from the analysis of the comments on online media articles. This analysis allowed the identification of the different common 'directions' or attitudes of the comments, which says something about how the people perceive the securitization of urban public space. All categories of the comments are supplemented by a diagram which shows an overview of the associated category.

Optimistic attitude

The people who are a part of this category generally tend to see the advantages and possibilities of the increased security measures. They assert that the added security will provide a safer and more secure environment. The following quote concerning the deployment of surface-to-air missiles in neighbourhoods and on top of flats perfectly demonstrates that: *"I cant see how this can be a bad thing having a added layer of defence. Are the general public who live in these buildings going to even see an effect of these batteries being in place? I servilely doubt it. I for one am all for this."* (Booth, 2012, p. 3).

People of this category also tend to mention the Munich 1972 Olympic Games, where an hostage of eleven athletes took place. These people argue that such an attack during the Olympic Games (and in this case on athletes) provides a reason for exceptional security. This sarcastic response from one of the commentators is an example: *"I reckon that in the spirit of the Games we should do away with all this intrusive security and just trust to luck and the goodwill of humanity. After all, that low-security approach really worked well at the 1972 Munich Olympics, didn't it?"* (Milne, 2012, p. 1).

There are also people who note that they feel safer if the army secures the venues and its surroundings, instead of security guards from G4S (a private security company). They note that they *"have more confidence in their highly trained armed forces"* than in a *"poorly trained half a size unable to find employment man."* (Hopkins, 2012, p. 4).

A small number of people that are part of this category touch upon the legal actions taken as a security measure, restrictions on protest for example*. "As for protest, I am also glad there are powers to "crack down""", "With half the world in attendance I don't want London to be shown as an unwelcoming, stroppy, divided city (even if it is)."* (Milne, 2012, p. 17) it is argued by one person. Others are mainly pleased that these protest-movements – such as Occupy – are removed. The diagram on the next page provides a schematic overview of the optimistic category.

How do the comments with an optimistic attitude towards the securitization of urban public space 'talk' about the topic?

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                    ┌─────────────────────────┐
                    │   Positive stance        │
                    │   towards the            │
                    │   securitization of      │
                    │   urban public space     │
                    └─────────────────────────┘
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Provides a safer and more secure urban environment	Historical events/mishaps have proved it is necessary	Removal of distortions in urban public space is positive

Critical attitude

The category these comments are part of is characterised by a critical attitude towards securitization. They assert that these exceptional security measures are not as positive as the optimistic individuals tend to see them. Most of these people are not amused by this development.

"I would be very unhappy with missiles being launched from my roof; it's thatched." (Guardian-unlimited, 2012, p. 1). This person is clearly pessimistic regarding high-velocity missiles on the roofs of flats. Other residents find them *"totally unsuitable"* (Booth, 2012, p. 1) and contest the use of them. Some are worried about the consequences if an airplane were to be taken down. Others also express their concerns with regard to the potential of these military devices to become a target themselves: *"I'm no expert, but isn't putting a huge warship capable of blowing up the olympics in the thames more of a risk than a deterrent."* (Milne, 2012, p. 19). There are also people who question whether the residents were consulted (which they were not), and whether this is lawful or not.

Many people are annoyed by the costs of the security operations. Some people are scared that it will cost the government and the taxpayers too much and argue that *"The Olympics should be suspended indefinitely if a country has to go to Defcon 2 and waste billions of pounds. The money and energy should go to paying off crippling debt."* (Guardian-unlimited, 2012, p. 1) People of this discourse also tend to state that *"You need to accept that there is a possibility, do what you can and carry on."* (Editorial, 2012, p. 10) and that *"You can't stop a suicide bomber ... period!"* (Telegraph, 2012, p. 1). They argue that *"life is inherently risky and that no matter how much 'protection' is put in place, you are never 100% safe."* (Booth, 2012, p. 1).Furthermore, people who are part of this category think that the temporary security measures deployed during the Olympic Games will eventually become permanent. One of the commentators articulated this very well: *"Unfortunately, once those technical means are in place, there is always the temptation to use them purely to safeguard the state (those in power) against its people."*

Although restricting access to certain areas during the Olympic Games is a major security operation, only a small number of commentators is concerned with the accessibility of the public spaces in the city: *"Despite having four hours to try I could not get anywhere near any of the sites, so dense were the army of security guards that seemed to clog every corner."* (Milne, 2012, p. 12).

This category is also characterized by fears of people's rights being restricted, particularly the right to protest as *"you can't even protest or you'll be committing a 'crime'."* (Milne, 2012, p. 8)

The last characteristic associated with this category is the feeling that – if such security is necessary – the Olympic Games should be cancelled. Although the security officials and politicians ensure everyone that the Games are not a security- but sports event, some *"can't help thinking that if we've reached*

the point of having to deploy missiles to protect a sports event then is it worth bothering with it? What is it we are supposed to be celebrating under such conditions?'' (theguardian.com, 2012, p. 1). The diagram below provides a schematic overview of the critical category.

How do the comments with a critical attitude towards the securitization of urban public space 'talk' about the topic?

The impartial attitude

The third category is characterized by relatively neutral/impartial perceptions or ideas of securitization. This is also a relatively small category compared to the first two discourses. The general perception of people who are part of the impartial category is that they are not specifically proposing, nor opposing the security measures/securitization, they are simply okay with it. It is recognized that there is a risk – and that this risk needs to be minimized – but they are not very fond of the developments: *''On a serious note there is a potential risk of subversive activity so you have to protect against that risk, at the same time I feel for the Londoners who will have to put up with all this and I agree the surveillance will be used well past the Games to control the populace.''* (Tudge, 2012, p. 1). Others assert that there is already a lot of security and surveillance in place, arguing that, therefore, the development is undesirable. However, they do think that security is necessary, except in another way: *''UK has become militarised enough, there is no need for that type involvement during a sports event. The security, even if significant in numbers, should be as invisible as possible.''* (Guardian-Unlimited, 2012, p. 1). Lastly, some argue that surveillance is not necessarily bad. According to them, it has to be proportional: *''It's the a priori assumption that more surveillance is a bad thing that I don't like. In my view level of surveillance is a balancing act to ensure maximum liberty.''* (Tudge, 2012, p. 5). The diagram on the next page provides a schematic overview of the impartial category.

<u>*How do the comments with an impartial attitude towards the securitization of urban public space 'talk' about the topic?*</u>

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          ┌────────────────────────┐
          │  Impartial/neutral stance │
          │  towards the securitization of │
          │  urban public space │
          └────────────────────────┘
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There is a risk which needs to be minimized, but not at all costs	Alright with security, though it should be practiced differently	The degree and amount of security is high already, we need proportional security

Uninformed or disinterested attitude

The last category is characterized by rather uninformed or disinterested perceptions and ideas of securitization. Similar to the latter category, this category is relatively small as well. This is not surprising, since people who are unfamiliar with the subject are not likely to comment on the article. One comment stated – quite literally – that this person was not informed very well: *''Ok so. Im confused - Is it smart to announce to the world that security has been compromised at these Olympic games? I mean.. thats like me putting a sign on my car saying- "My car alarm and door locks are broken and I have tons of expensive things in here. I hope the alarm I have that isnt working will keep you car thieves away.''* (Editorial, 2012, p. 1). This particular individual acknowledges (s)he is confused and from the rest of the comment this becomes clear. (S)he is not well informed because the security has not been compromised, it has just changed (the military bridges the gap which the security company G4S was not able to fill). A very representative quote for this category is: *''We don't really know if it will make us feel safer or more of a target.''* (Booth, 2012, p. 1). This is a representative quote as many people are not well enough informed to form an opinion concerning the subject, they need more facts to determine how they feel about it. Another example of the uninformed attitude is: *''Then again, ground to air missiles hardly pose a threat to the residents.''* (Booth, 2012, p. 1) This, again, shows people are not informed well enough to make a 'solid' judgement regarding securitization, because surface-to-air missiles clearly pose a threat to everyone – including residents – when they are fired and possibly hit an aircraft (the aircraft is not going to vaporise). The diagram on the next page provides a schematic overview of the uninformed category.

How do the comments with an uninformed attitude towards the securitization of urban public space 'talk' about the topic?

Uninformed/disinterested stance
towards the securitization of
urban public space

↓

Unable to form a 'valid' opinion
concerning securitization due to lack of
information or interest

The categorical attitudes within the comments on the online newspaper articles have been identified and discussed. In the following section the discourses associated with the comments are discussed.

Discourses comments

From the responses on the online newspaper articles, several discourses are identified. The discourses were identified through analysing the reasoning behind the statements that were made. The discourses that are identified are: Risk of technology, controlling the population, security attracts or deters threats, (no) need for military involvement, security state, security too extensive, restrictions/security not temporary, safety before all, security does not stop everything and people not involved.

Risk of technology

The 'risk of technology' discourse is characterised by lines of reasoning that make clear the author of the comment is afraid of the security technology. The majority of the statements concern the potential risk that is associated with the missile-systems. The comments entail statements such as *''what pray, happens to any missiles fired and miss? Where do they land?''* (Booth, 2012, p. 1) and *''I'd be shitting myself if I had a battery of missiles on my roof for a month, not to mention the soldiers guarding the missiles and the armed police guarding the soldiers''* (Booth, 2012, p. 2) Another such statement was one which jokingly assumed that the missiles would vaporise the aircraft (Milne, 2012). However, not everyone is critical towards the missiles. Some people argued that they would not mind living under a missile system during the Olympic games (Dodd, 2012). Yet another person reasoned that the missiles would hardly pose a threat, and that the residents would prefer a bit of debris instead of a suicide bombing helicopter (Booth, 2012). One analysed comment maintained that *''putting a huge warship… in the Thames is more of a risk than a deterrent''* (Milne, 2012, p. 19).

This exemplifies that there is a broad range of lines of reasoning behind this discourse. Some do not see a risk, whereas others are extremely scared. This possibly has to do with the context in which the comment is written. Someone living in London may find it scarier than someone who lives in Manchester for example.

Controlling of population by government

This discourse is mostly characterised by opposing statements concerning securitization with the reasoning that it is an attempt from the government at controlling the population. It is for example argued that when the military is used to repress dissent, a countries priorities start to get really tangled (theguardian.com, 2011). Others think the high level of security has to do with putting off protest (Gibson, 2011), they find it an attack on civil liberties (Milne, 2012). Some people assert that the security plans shows that the government will do anything to maintain order and control over its population (Tudge, 2012). The same person also recognised that there is the temptation for the government to use those security means to safeguard the state (those in power) against its people (Tudge, 2012). However, not everyone is negative about this; *''As for protest, I am also glad there are powers to "crack down", as you put it. With half the world in attendance I don't want London to be shown as an unwelcoming, stroppy, divided city (even if it is)''* (Milne, 2012, p. 17).

This discourse is very much related to the 'powers' controlling that population. It is assumed that these powers use the extensive security operations as a means to maintain order and control over the civilians. Nevertheless, few seem to disagree and argue instead that it is a positive thing because it provides a 'better' situation.

Security attracts or deters threats

The 'security attracts or deters threats' discourse is characterised by lines of reasoning that oppose the extensive security measures because it is assumed that those security measures attract terrorists. One person responded to the question 'do you think the involvement of armed forces will help to guarantee the safety of athletes and visitors?' with *''absolutely NOT, it will make it a target for all sorts of extremists''* (theguardian.com, 2011, p. 1). On another online article someone noted that those missile-systems could become a target as well (Booth, 2012). Nevertheless, not everyone shares this thought. Another commentator argued that it was good to have such a high visibility operation because that would be the best to deter threats (Milne, 2012). This is an excellent example of how different people 'construct' different realities. Each person beliefs in his or her own truth and reproduces this through such comments.

Military involvement

This discourse is characterised by a wide range of reasons for proposing or opposing certain security measures. Some people argue that the involvement of the military is necessary. This can be for different reasons; one person asserts that it is a hated country (Milne, 2012). Next to that, there is a large group of people that argue they prefer the army (that presumably knows how to handle a weapon, and knows what they are doing) instead of private security guards (Editorial, 2012). Then, there was someone that said he or she was *''happier having the armed forces around as opposed to G4S, but I get real nervous whenever troops are deployed on home soil''* (Editorial, 2012, p. 4).

Yet, there are also people noting their dissatisfaction with that development: *''Soldiers patrolling a civilian event!? Sounds very odd and un British''* (Editorial, 2012, p. 1). Someone else also noted nobody wants the army as the police (Editorial, 2012).

This discourse is another good example how, within one discourse, people('s opinions) can differ greatly. Some fully trust the military, while others are kind of feared from their involvement.

Security state

The 'security state' discourse is characterised by a line of reasoning that the security is getting out of control leading to a 'security state'. People note that it is scary and that the politics of fear are upon them (theguardian.com, 2011). They find it terrifying and say that *"it's the security state unleashed"* (Booth, 2012, p. 6). Another statement was that the nation no longer questions why such extensive security is necessary but why a private company could not organize it (Hopkins, 2012). Someone else states that *"The Olympics are a fabulous excuse to increase the already growing security state that the UK is evolving into"* (Tudge, 2012, p. 3). This is echoed by others that assert the technology will be used well after the Olympic games until that technology becomes obsolete (Tudge, 2012). This discourse tends to be characterised by a kind of fear of an 'Orwellian' or '1984' situation. People seem to be scared that the nation is slowly adopting the conditions for such a scene.

Security too extensive

This discourse is characterised by the line of reasoning that the planned security measures were simply too extensive. People argued that they questioned whether it was even worth bothering if missiles had to be deployed (theguardian.com, 2011). Some touch upon militarisation, asserting that this is yet another phase towards the increasing militarisation (Milne, 2012) or arguing that the *"UK has become militarised enough"* (theguardian.com, 2012, p. 1). Another statement even went as far as stating that it felt like a military occupation (Milne, 2012).

The lines of reasoning associated with this discourse entail that the security is just becoming too much, and that this extent of security measures should not be implemented.

Restrictions/security not temporary

This discourse is characterised by the line of reasoning that the security will become permanent, or at least stay longer after the Olympic Games or that these security measures are implemented weeks or months before the event. The latter is exemplified by one commentator: *"but it seems they are implementing a lot of restrictions weeks or even months in advance"* (Gibson, 2011, p. 7). Another person states that he or she has to do with the Londoners because he agrees that the surveillance will be used well past the Olympics to control the populace (Tudge, 2012). Someone else agrees with that, he or she mentions that it is unfortunate that, once all the security measures are in place, there is the temptation for the government to make use of them to protect the state (i.e. those in power) against its people (Tudge, 2012). The thought that the security is not temporary is rearticulated in *"Can't help feeling all these temporary measures will quietly become permanent"* (Tudge, 2012, p. 5).

This discourse is clearly dominated by the fear that the security measures of the Olympic Games would stay after the event, and that it could be used by the government to control its population.

Safety before everything else

The 'safety before everything else' discourse is characterised by the line of reasoning that asserts safety precedes (almost) everything else. The safety – i.e. preventing a disaster – is seen as a justification for the security measures. One person commented that he or she has no problem with the government doing anything to prevent an attack (Milne, 2012). Someone else suggested that the security forces have to do everything within their power to minimize the risk of such attacks (Milne, 2012). Some people refer to historical mishaps to justify the use of the security, especially to the attacks during the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972 (theguardian.com, 2011; Milne, 2012). Nevertheless, there are also people who assert that the *"level of surveillance is a balancing act to ensure maximum* liberty" (Tudge, 2012, p. 5). He or she does acknowledge there has to be a certain

level of security, but that it should not diminish liberties. A very strong opposing statement was *''Is sport so critical to the survival of the nation that it must be protected at all costs? Ban the Olympics - it is that that is the security risk to the nation.''* (Telegraph, 2012, p. 1). This person thinks that if a country has to go to this length of securing the country/city, the event should simply be cancelled because of the impact of the security. The lines of reasoning in this discourse are seem quite straightforward. Some argue safety – thus security – should precede everything else, whereas others argue the security is becoming too extensive.

Security does not stop everything

This discourse is characterised by the line of reasoning that the security measures that were implemented simply cannot prevent every kind of threat or attack. With regards to the missile-systems one person noted that *''These things aren't going to stop some idiot with a gun or a bag full of anthrax are they''* (theguardian.com, 2012, p. 1). Someone else asserted that the heavy security was just a show, and that you cannot stop a suicide bomber (Telegraph, 2012). Another interesting comment was: *''We all know that where there is a will, there is a way… You need to accept that there is a possibility, do what you can and carry on''* (Editorial, 2012, p. 10). This discourse is dominated by such thoughts that assert it is simply impossible to protect oneself from everything, that it is impossible to have zero risk.

People uninvolved

This discourse is characterised by the line of reasoning that in one of the security measures – the missile-systems (some on top of flats) – the people that were most affected by it were not involved in the plans. One of the commentators noted *''Residents' permission?... What if some residents do not want missiles on top of their buildings? Do they just get ignored? I did not realise we were in a totalitarian state, yet''* (Booth, 2012, p. 1). This is rearticulated by someone else who questions whether those missile systems could simply be placed on the buildings. Next to that he questions who owns the building and whether they are being paid for the inconvenience. He or she also asks: *''what about the residents?''* (Booth, 2012, p. 2). This person states that he or she would be terrified of it, arguing that the trouble those systems cause are disproportionate to the benefit, even if nothing goes wrong (Booth, 2012). Such statements are echoed by others for example: *''what power or not do these residents have? Can they say no to this? Are they without ANY say?''* (Booth, 2012, p. 13). This discourse is clearly associated with strong power relations and this is even confirmed quite literally. Several commentators are dissatisfied with the fact that the residents in the neighbouring area or of the flats were not consulted at all.

7. Conclusion

The online newspaper articles have formed the background – i.e. context – for the responses on those articles. The comments that were made on the media are thus in a specific context. The commentators did not just place a comment out of the blue, they did it as a reaction on the online article. It is for instance logical that if articles specifically addressed the deployment of missile-systems during the Olympic Games, the comments are based around that topic as well.

In both the online newspaper articles and the comments, several categories of attitudes towards the securitization of urban public space are identified. In both categories it was noticeable that there was a more optimistic and a more critical attitude that existed amongst them. Next to that, there were articles and comments which seemed to belong to neither of those categories, the impartial attitude. Lastly, in the comments there is a fourth category identified: the uninformed or disinterested attitude. It is commonsensical that this category was only identified in the comments on the online articles since an author of such an article would not write about it if he or she was not interested or informed about the topic. Though, the categories of the media and comments may be the same, the composition of them is sometimes quite different. The statements within one category of attitude often highly vary between the media and the comments. The identification of these categories helps to illustrate that there is an extremely wide variety of attitudes towards the securitization of urban public space.

Next to the categories of attitudes, several discourses were identified in the online newspaper articles and the comments. There are many differences between the discourses that are identified in the media and comments. However, there also seem to be several discourses that are shared by them.

One of those is the 'safety before everything else' discourse. In both the media and comments there are statements that express the need for safety, and the need for minimal risk. However, this discourse is not only optimistic towards security. At the same time, the media and commentators assert that it is impossible to guarantee security. Especially in the comments people are questioning whether the Olympic Games (for which the security is deployed) is so important that it requires such extensive security measures, since these measures also impact upon non-participants and the non-audience of the event. This discourse is also very much brought into practice as the security officials plan for the worst case scenario, whether this is a somewhat likely one or not. From judging the security plans, it is clear that literally everything possible is done to provide as much safety as possible.

There are also similarities between the 'impact on liberties' discourse identified in online newspaper articles and the 'controlling of population by government' discourse identified in the responses. Both the discourses include statements that refer to the restrictions on protest and dissent. Though, this is contested by many authors and commentators, there are also people who are more open to it. These people assert that restrictions on representation (a civil liberty) are for the better. These discourses are very closely related to the concept of power. The ones in power – e.g. the state – determines that a particular liberty (free speech for example) is restricted during the Olympic Games. This also means that people who oppose this, are not legally allowed to protest against it – not even weeks before the event. In this case, those in power repress the 'voice' of those not on power.

Furthermore, there are some small similarities between the 'military involvement' discourses of the media and comments. Both in the media and the comments there are statements that attempt to justify the involvement of the military, it would ensure a safe and secure games. It is surprising enough that many responses propose the involvement of the military. However, the statements in the comments were proposing this involvement quite a bit more (and more 'severe') compared to the

reports in the media. This lies in the fact that, apparently, many people have a lot of faith in the army. Nevertheless, not every commentator was positive about the involvement of the military, whereas not a single analysed article was negative concerning military involvement. This discourse also shows how certain actors try to influence the thoughts, feelings and realities of others. Namely, the government asserted that the fears of the population were exaggerated, and that the involvement of the military was a welcome relief. It is true that some people were delighted with the involvement of the military, but others were not at all. In this, the government is very selective in what they see as evidence for 'a welcome relief'.

The 'security attracts or deters threats' discourse is quite coherent in both the media and the comments. In the media there are many reports from security officials that argue the security (such as missile systems) deters potential threats. These assertions are echoed by few commentators that belief the high-visibility security operations will truly deter threats. However, the majority of the comments entails statements arguing that the deployment of some security measures – such as missile-systems and a warship – is likely to attract threats, because they think it is a target for terrorists. This is a good example of how context and knowledge about the subject plays a role in discourse. A different context, and different (maybe even contrasting) knowledge about the subject brings forth a very different a discourse.

It is important to note that the historical, political and cultural context matter in discourses. These discourses 'exist' in a particular historical, political and cultural context, which influence these discourses. A certain situation helps to 'bring forth' a particular discourse. This was also noticeable during the preparations for the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. In September 2001, whilst the security plans for the Olympic Games in Athens were made, a terrorist attack took place on the Twin Towers in the United States of America. Because of this specific event, the security of the games was majorly increased to provide a safe environment. Because of this situation, security policies became stricter since no one ever wanted to an event like that to occur, the political but also cultural context very much influenced this. Something similar happened in Great Britain. On July 7th 2005, a day after London was assigned as host of the 2012 Olympic Games, a terrorist attack with four explosions took place in London. This sparked a lot of fear, not only amongst residents of London but also amongst the government, it became visible how vulnerable London was for such a threat. Therefore, the security during the Olympic Games had to be 'top-notch'. One can only speculate about how the security of the Olympic Games would have looked like if they took place now, after the attacks in Paris on November 13th 2015 to name only one such occurrence. All major cities in Europe (and also some in other continents) were at a high state of readiness. After a reported threat, Brussels was essentially shut down; schools were closed and the metro was out of service, public life was basically paralyzed for a few days. If the Olympic Games this year (2016) would have taken place in London, the security would have most likely looked different (i.e. even more extensive), along with the discourses. It is in a particular context – historical, cultural and political – in which a socially constructed phenomenon as discourses takes place. In this context a particular account of 'truth' arises.

It is also clear how power is very much involved in the discourses that were identified. Perhaps the most excellent example of this is the following. Some of the residents went to the high court because they were not consulted (and informed on short notice) about the missile-systems on top of their flat, they also believed that such a security measure put them at a particular risk (the consequences of a failing rocket may be catastrophic for example). However, they failed in court. The missile-systems were placed there anyways without further consultation, compensation or whatsoever. Another example is how it was forbidden to have a poster with a certain political text on it displayed behind

your window (of your home). If you did this anyways, the authorities were authorised to enter your home and remove it. These examples illustrate how those in power exercise this power to maintain order and control over those who are not in power. Furthermore, these examples also show how discourses related to the securitization of urban public space are also very much in (social) practice.

8. Discussion

In addition to provide the context for this thesis, the literature review also functioned to identify three major critiques in academic literature concerning the securitization of public space. The three critiques that were identified are (1) that safety seems to precede everything else, (2) that the built environment and its utilisation are affected by the securitization of public space and (3) that the securitization of urban public space seems to be related to the 'War on Terror'.

The discourses that were identified in the online newspaper articles and the comments show some similarities with the critiques in the academic literature. For example, the 'safety seems to precede everything else' critique is similar to the 'safety before everything else' discourse. It is indeed true that it was tried to prepare for the inevitable attack, they prepared for the worst-case scenario and it was attempted to have zero risk. Though, it was not explicitly noted in this thesis (because of focus) the commercial aspect of the Olympic games, and the economical legacy that was promised were both also a factor in the security. The second critique about the impact on the built environment and its utilisation (access, social interaction and representation) was somewhat recognizable in the media and comments as well. People were concerned about the consequences of a potentially fired missile on the environment and its people. Next to that, people were extremely concerned about the liberties that were affected by the security plans and policies. The right to representation was restricted because of a ban on protest, i.e. free speech. Several authors and many commentators addressed the exclusion of protesters (purifying the city) and the implications of the security measures on such civil liberties. However, the access to urban public space and the social interaction were not touched upon in the discourses. Few people mentioned they were not visiting London during the Olympic Games because of the security, since it would make them feel extremely uncomfortable. And not a single statement regarding social interaction in public space was found in this research. The third critique about the 'War on Terror' is somewhat noticeable in the media and comments (that is, the discourses) as well, bet less explicit as with the other two critiques identified in the scientific literature. There is only one author of an online newspaper article that explicitly refers to the 'War on Terror' and only two comments were identified that also included this term. However, there are quite a lot of comments that discuss the control the government exercises over its population, which partially constitutes the 'War on Terror' (such as excluding people who want to protest).

Summarizing, the three main critiques are most certainly also identifiable in the discourses that are identified in the online newspaper articles and the responses to them. It does seem, however, that these discourses – and specifically the critique towards the securitization of urban public space in these discourses – are fundamental, but to a lesser extent than the critique in the scientific literature is. The scientific literature really 'digs into' the reasons for securitization – for example why access is restricted, and who restricts that access for whom (i.e. who excludes). From those critiques it became much more evident that power plays a very important role – if not the most important role – in the securitization of urban public space.

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